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I. Introduction
This paper offers an overview of one of the most important
environmental milestones in our history. Beyond the dramatic
changes in the lives of Love Canal residents themselves, the events
there marked the dawn of our awareness, as a nation, of environ-
mental hazards, and led to major changes in governmental policies.
I will present a brief history of the events, note the State University
of New York at Buffalo's (UB) role in the crisis, and offer some
observations on conducting science in an emergency atmosphere.
In preparation for this paper, I went back to Love Canal to
take some pictures and to talk. Two people there, expressing their
positions with eloquence and conviction, pretty well laid out the polar
views of the situation. A guy in a truck said he had lived there all his
adult life and lives there still-in one of the remaining occupied
houses. He said neighborhoods around the dumpsite are not dan-
gerous now and were not then. In short, he believed that a beautiful
community was destroyed because everyone panicked. From a
workman rebuilding a driveway in the area being resettled (Black
Creek Village) came the opposite view. He said there are still
chemicals in the ground, it is still dangerous here, and the idea of
resettlement is the stupidest thing he ever heard. He had grown up
east of the old dump in the LaSalle Housing area, now a grassy field.
These statements also reflect positions held twenty years ago by
residents, governmental representatives, chemical companies, health
investigators, and attorneys.
II. A Capsule History of Events at Love Canal
Table 1 sketches some of the principal events before and
during the Love Canal crisis.2 In a ditch remaining from a failed
See infra App. A for principal events of the Love Canal crisis.
2 Full treatments appear in other works. See generally Lois M. GIBBs, LOVE
CANAL: THE STORY CONTINUES (1998) (author tells a detailed story of her
experience as a resident of Love Canal); ADELINE G. LEVINE, LOVE CANAL:
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hydroelectric enterprise, Hooker Chemical, the City of Niagara Falls,
and possibly unknown others began dumping industrial wastes and
refuse, starting in 1942 and ending in 1954. Some of the waste was
toxic to humans and other vertebrates. Against legal advice from
Hooker Chemical and from their own attorneys, the Niagara Falls
School Board bought the now-capped dump site to construct the 99'
Street School. A building was constructed at the very eastern edge of
the filled ditch. Some ofthe land was sold to a sub-division developer
and settlement around the site proceeded. By 1976 there were the first
tremors oftrouble to come, and due to complaints and press coverage,
Calspan Corporation was hired to do an environmental assessment.
Their report was disturbing, and by the spring of 1978, an
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) investigation detected
toxins in the basements of "Ring 1" homes.' New York State
responded with some rapidity. On the recommendation of Health
Commissioner Robert Whalen, a health emergency was declared for
inner ring homes and evacuations soon began.
While all of that was relatively straightforward, the real
struggle then started. Citizens in the "outer ring" of homes, those not
immediately adjacent to the dumpsite, became alarmed that the toxins
may be reaching out beyond the first two rings. Lois Gibbs and the
Love Canal Homeowners Association ran a grassroots survey and
were convinced that old stream courses (swales) were conducting
toxins into the heart of their neighborhood. Their data, analyzed by
health researcher Beverly Paigen, supported this, but the New York
State Department of Health (NYS DOH) study in the same area did
not. The State resisted further evacuation, unconvinced and fearful of
the implied costs, but pressure from citizens and the press escalated.
SCIENCE, POLITICS, AND PEOPLE (1982) (discussing the obstacles faced by the
residents of Love Canal and how they handled the crisis); ALLAN MAZUR, A
HAZARDOUS INQUIRY: THE RASHOMON EFFECT AT LOVE CANAL (1998) (accounts
of the Love Canal investigation examining the interplay of political, social and
scientific issues).
3 Ring 1 homes 'were those with land abutting the old canal, on East 97th
Street and West 99th Street. See infra App. C for map of the Love Canal site.
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By the spring of 1980, an EPA study detected chromosomal damage
among residents of the outer ring. Implications of the findings and
mishandling of the situation led to an emotional and political
firestorm that burned off the last agency resistance. After an
agonizing delay in which further studies were started by Beverly
Paigen and other groups, October finally saw a federal bill signed to
fund home buyouts. As the immediate crisis spooled down, the Love
Canal Revitalization Agency was formed to clean up the mess, but
with an eye toward redevelopment of the area for residential and
commercial use.
The area north of Colvin, called Black Creek Village,' is now
refurbished and reoccupied. Despite assurances from federal and state
agencies, anxiety continues about the safety of raising families here.
If the opposition is correct it will never be habitable, but many think
it is safe enough now. The quality of information needed to make
these judgments is still surrounded by uncertainty. Why that is so is
in a tale in itself.
III. The University at Buffalo Responds to the Crisis
About fifteen miles southeast of Love Canal lies the State
University of New York's main Buffalo campus, with our Medical
School a little further in toward the city. As one of the great "Centers"
of the State University of New York (SUNY) system, it seems
reasonable that we should have "done something" to provide help
during the crisis. Guidance and answers were what everyone wanted.
Few of us then understood the complexities.
Outsiders, and many insiders, saw the university as a helpless
or unhelpful giant. I talked to a distinguished senior professor, telling
him that I was going to report on UB's role in Love Canal and I asked
what he thought. He replied, "Well, that will take about one para-
graph."s That view was shared by an equally distinguished environ-
4 See infra App. C.
s Interview by Paul McClennan with Lester Milbrath, Professor, State
University of New York at Buffalo, Buffalo, NY. (Sept. 11, 1998).
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mental journalist who had watched it all unfold in the late 1970s. He
thought UB's role was not even worth the paragraph. Lois Gibbs,
President of the Love Canal Homeowners Association, put it this
way:
The health department wasn't the only less-than-helpful
agency. Except from a few people working on their own-like Dr.
Vincent Ebert, a geographer, Addie Levine, a sociologist, and Dr.
Paigen-we didn't get any help from the State University (SUNY) at
Buffalo either. We had many technical questions about the construc-
tion, the testing procedures and the ways chemicals could disperse
through an area. The president of SUNY at Buffalo said he would set
up a university task force. They were going to have a meeting of the
steering committee, and he sent me a letter saying they were setting
it up. But to this day, that's all they ever sent me.'
Did the University really do nothing? That depends on
whether you see it as a top down corporate structure, or a neighbor-
hood of scholars.
This is how the University responded from the top down: our
administration established the Lee Panel in 1978, shortly after the
crisis broke. Vice-President Albert Somit called George Lee, Dean of
Engineering, to ask him to chair a committee on Love Canal. The
committee membership was named by Dr. Somit. Professor Lee was
told that the group was to act as a panel of experts. When questions
came in about Love Canal, Dean Lee would direct them to the proper
member for answers. However, the objective here was only to field
questions, not to start research.! The UB administration had been
warned through the SUNY Chancellor's office to keep their hands out
of the situation-the thinking apparently being that UB, as a state
agency, could be sued. While this might sound to the neutral observer
like a strange way to run a railroad, it does reflect the institutional
culture of the time, the looming threat of legal action and one of the
dysfunctional aspects of our relationship to the state. It is clear that
6 GIBBs, supra note 2, at 85.
7 George Lee, Professor, State University ofNew York at Buffalo, personal
communication in Buffalo, NY, Sept. 10, 1998.
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George Lee felt the chill of this constraint very strongly. The national
political environment was pretty bad as well, and many of the faculty,
who attended what was apparently the only general faculty meeting
on Love Canal, came to express outrage rather than to offer expert
help. This was also the post-Watergate, post-Vietnam era and univer-
sities were starting to suffer the anti-institutional backlash that is with
us still. On the Niagara Frontier, the local press-in strong sympathy
with the plight ofthose living at Love Canal-became very critical of
this enormous and powerful university just standing by.
When the health crisis intensified at Love Canal in the spring
of 1980, Medical School Dean John Naughton was asked by the
Assistant Secretary of HEW in Washington, D. C. if UB would direct
a health study of the population, even then in the process of
evacuation. The understanding was that the Center for Disease
Control (CDC) would provide a contract in support of equipment and
personnel. By the summer of 1980, an amended directive arrived
saying that UB, the CDC, and now the EPA were to put together a
joint proposal. The CDC advanced some starter funds. Dean
Naughton then assembled a team including many department chairs,
all with strong credentials. He will have more to say on these events
below.8 As things unfolded, there were too many cooks in the kitchen.
State Health commissioner Harvey Axelrod thought UB should go
ahead, but the CDC was favoring Columbia University as the main
contractor, and proceeded to form its own advisory panel.' However,
by this time, the EPA chromosome study scare started, and the
citizens became increasingly convinced that none of the scientists
knew what they were doing, Beverly Paigen's group excepted.
Scientists became convinced that it was almost impossible to work in
a pressure cooker, and agency turf competition tied everyone's hands.
As this went around and around, Ronald Reagan was elected
President and effectively stopped federal health research on this issue.
See infra App. B.
John Naughton, Professor, State University of New York at Buffalo,
personal communication in Buffalo, Aug. 11, 1998.
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Even as events of 1978 emerged, three UB professors began
playing roles in the crisis-Dr. Wayne Hadley (biology), Dr. Vincent
Ebert (geography), and Dr. Adeline Gordon Levine (sociology).
Another grass roots effort by Beverly Paigen (Roswell Park Cancer
Institute) was in the same free enterprise mode. While the University
did little to support these efforts, neither did it interfere with them.
Professor Wayne Hadley became an advisor. Lois Gibbs and the Love
Canal Homeowners Association, while not the only movement that
had a powerful role in forcing government action, ultimately
influenced the promotion ofmajor environmental legislation. Hadley
gave her critical guidance through the maze of political institutions
and technical reports, especially early in the emergency when no one
else would listen. His role is explained in the following quote from
Lois Gibbs' book:
I went to my brother-in-law, Wayne Hadley, a biologist
and, at the time, a professor at the State University of
New York at Buffalo. He had worked on environmental
problems and knew a lot about chemicals. I asked him
to translate some of that jibber-jabber in the articles
into English. I showed Wayne Mike Brown's
[newspaper] articles listing the chemicals in the canal
and what they were. I was really alarmed by his answer.
Some of the chemicals, he said, can affect the nervous
system. Just a little bit, even the amount that's in paint
or gasoline, can kill brain cells. I still couldn't believe
it, but if it were true, I wanted to get Michael out of that
99" Street School.'0
The immediate outcome was that they would not transfer her
son out of the school, and so fomented a rebellion. Wayne Hadley
became a trusted advisor and guide through the strange maze this
young housewife was about to enter. He was both technical expert
10 GIBBs, supra note 2, at 27.
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and systems broker. Regardless of all of our official roles and duties,
this may still be one of the most valuable things we can do.
As soon as the crisis emerged, Professor Vincent Ebert
contacted Lois Gibbs. She was most concerned about the spread of
toxins from the dumpsite to the neighborhoods beyond 99' Street, the
so-called "outer ring." Working as a soils expert, he immediately
started an on-site survey, supplemented by geological technical
reports." He found that while canal soils are relatively impermeable,
cracks and sand layers allow potential migration of lechates. It was
already known that the bedrock here dips southward, allowing
migrating chemicals to reach the Niagara River. However, some of the
surface water drains northward into Bergholtz Creek, and then west and
south to the river. Dr. Ebert recognized that swales cross the original
path of the canal and were filed with unconsolidated material, so
leaving natural drainage conduits away from the canal. "Thus the basic
setting of Love Canal can be likened to a leaky bathtub filled to the
rim.... The overflow and ground seepage found its way into permeable
soil layers, desiccation cracks of the [highly clay] soils, topographic
depressions, and old swale channel." 2 As an unpaid volunteer,
Professor Ebert contributed a lot, and early enough to have impact as
testimony at Albany hearings in 1979. The second consequence of his
effort was to be kicked off the site by the New York officials when it
became clear that he intended to openly publish a report.
Professor Adeline Levine, during the same time period of 1978,
had begun to gather field interviews and documents to record the
evolution of the entire event. Her later book Love Canal: Science,
Politics andPeople,13 has become a classic in the environmental litera-
ture. Professor Levine first heard ofthe Love Canal crisis on a newscast
in August 1978 and visited the site just as Ring I was being vacated.
She and her graduate research methods students took on the formidable
"1 Vincent Ebert, Professor, State University of New York at Buffalo,
personal communication in Buffalo, NY, Sept. 3, 1998.
12 Vincent Ebert, Love Canal: An Environmental Disaster, 10 TRANSITIONS
2, 6 (1980) (on file with the BUFFALO ENVTL L. J.).
13 LEVINE, supra note 2.
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interviewing and recording task-eventually continuing for about 3
years of field work. What came out was an outstanding synthesis ofthe
politics, emotion, science and drama of one of the key environmental
crises in our history, all carefully documented. Not only does it consider
a range of views, but it was also published in record time. A good bit
of what I am presenting in this paper is due to her efforts, and of course,
you will also hear from her directly a little later.
In the spring of 1979, UB's Environmental Studies Center
sponsored a four part public forum on the Love Canal Crisis, in a
teach-in type format. While it attracted a scatter of officials and
environmentalists, it is not clear that it led to any specific actions.14
Finally, when the crisis was nearly over, in the summer of 1980,
two other UB faculty members conducted research, both a part of
Beverly Paigen's health study of children from the outer ring area, with
control group comparisons. I supervised a growth study, in which we
found shorter stature in the exposed children. And Professor Stephen
Barron, a UB neurologist, did a nerve conduction study, finding a
somewhat ambiguous, borderline exposure effect. So inthe final phase,
we began to get some better quality data. But arguments continued in
the scientific community, and in the end, decisions were made on the
fate of the community without clear guidance from the research, largely
on political grounds. It may not have mattered whether the university
responded strongly or not. While part of the reason for it being taken
out of scientists' hands may have been due to the slow pace at which
we produce information and the pressured environment, the scientific
work itself bears a closer look.
IV. Scientific Work at Love Canal
Science here was a long way from the clinic and laboratory,
with all of their securities. It was rough, fast field work at a low level
toxic exposure site-a situation designed to promote borderline
results and disagreements. Allan Mazur's 1998 book A Hazardous
14 Lester Milbrath, personal communication.
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Inquiry" offers this outsider's analysis. "The scientific study of Love
Canal looks more like a prizefight than a search for truth. Some
commentators on this and other technical controversies have given up
the notion of objectivity regarding scientific expertise, as no different
than any other resource that can be used to win political goals."' Had
Mazur been there, he would probably have seen not so much a prize
fight, but rather a search for truth in the face of adversity. What we
need to understand is that situations like this will never be business-
as-usual investigations. Let's take a look at what happened.
New York Department of Health (NYS DOH) studies of June
1978 must be called "emergency epidemiology." The way things
work, then and now, is that the NYS DOH has primary responsibility
for protecting public health. In March 1978, the NYS DOH heard
from the Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) that
basements of fourteen dwellings backing onto the canal proper show
evidence of a number of dangerous organic compounds. The next
month, Health Commissioner Robert Whalen visited Love Canal and
was dismayed by smelly black ooze in the basements and surface
waste near the 99' Street School. By June 1978, his investigators
started a health study of inner ring residents, including a long
questionnaire and blood sampling. Dr. Whalen also ordered cleanup
of surface wastes and fencing of the canal site. Results of these
studies were pretty rough and ambiguous, but they were all that the
officials had. The inner ring group showed higher than expected
numbers of birth defects, and there was a cluster of miscarriages on
south 99" Street. Though there were no signs of elevated acute
illnesses, this was enough for the NYS DOH on August 2 to order
emergency relocation of Ring I residents. 7 Critics found fault with
this study on the following grounds:
15 MAZUR, supra note 2.
16 Id. at 92.
17 NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, LOVE CANAL: PUBLIC
HEALTH TIME BOMB 27-32 (Sept. 1978). See also LEVINE, supra note 2, at 28-29;
Mike Brown, Evacuation ofKids Urged, NIAGARA GAZETTE, Aug. 2, 1978, at I
(references to Whalen's evacuation order).
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1. There was no control group of unexposed
people.
2. Blood testing was mismanaged and some of
the samples were lost.
3. Family physicians were slow in providing
requested records.
4. The questionnaire was long, dense and hard to
understand.
5. And finally, reports were slow to appear and
many were never published.18 It is not clear
the extent to which results influenced the
Commissioner's decision, but he had seen
enough. The first evacuation was ordered.
NYS DOH studies in the fall of 1978 expanded to the outer
ring of homes and by December of 1978, they concluded that there
was no excess miscarriage rate beyond the first ring. While that was
going on, Lois Gibbs came up with the swale hypothesis-that the
illnesses and problems reported to her seem to cluster along former
low, wet areas and stream beds, since filled in but recalled by older
residents. Beverly Paigen begins working with Gibbs to help her
analyze results of a survey taken by the homeowners themselves.
Distrust of the NYS DOH was growing. Paigen's analysis shows
clusters of kidney and bladder problems, elevated miscarriage rates,
and other disorders. AlthoughtheNYS DOH was using a different set
of swale maps, the two groups of investigators were in contact in an
effort to rectify the disagreements. At the very least, the NYS DOH
had finally been forced to listen to Paigen's conclusions. By January
1979, the new State Health Commissioner, David Axelrod, accepted
the presence of fetal disorders in the "wet areas" (swales and ponds).
In early February, he recommended removing pregnant women and
young children from the outer ring, but not a complete evacuation.
The idea of splitting up families this way caused extreme annoyance
Is LEVINE, supra note 2, at 87-89; MAZUR, supra note 2, at 164-66.
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within the community. Later in the spring of 1979 Beverly Paigen
testified before a congressional committee, reporting a miscarriage
risk of 3.5 times normal in the wet areas, and other disorders at rates
higher than those reported by NYS DOH.
Example: Birth Defects" Wet DU
DOH 12.5% 5.1%
Paigen 20.0% 6.8%
Paigen explained these differences as a result of the NYS
DOH insisting on physician verification of health problems. This
made the NYS DOH values seem relatively low.
Paigen's high morbidity values were criticized as well. She
recognized flaws in her own work:
1. Time and resources were in short supply
2. Her data collectors were not professionals;
3. Conditions were not verified medically; and
4. Interviewers and respondents may have over-
reported.
Others criticized her as well, particularly for lack of
objectivity
1. This was not a "double-blind"20 research design.
2. Some residents knew the "swale theory" and
where their houses were in reference to swales.
3. The analysis was exploratory, not deductive-
a mistake that a "real epidemiologist" would
not make.
4. The wet and dry areas were adjusted geo-
graphically to fit the data. Further, any wet
"9 MAZUR, supra note 2, at 173.
20 A double-blind study is a study in which neither interviewer nor
respondent knows the hypothesis.
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area was used, not just those draining away
from the canal.
Those of you who know Beverly Paigen personally will
recognize that the last accusation is nonsense, and the third implies
that there is only one way to understand things. Nor is it clear how
you run a double blind study design when everyone involved suspects
what the problem is (toxin related health effects) and where the toxins
came from. In fact, she conducted her studies with very modest
financial support, and maintained a much lower cost/benefit ratio than
did the state.
Later NYS DOH studies were done at the area where a swale
exits, near the canal at 99' Street. They cut a trench down to the base
of the old stream bed, striking water. However, it was not contami-
nated, nor were there differences found between other wet/dry areas.21
There was also concern that clusters may have been due to patterns
of factors such as smoking or occupation.
Meanwhile, everyone seemed to have ignored one critical
piece of research. Rowley and Christian began a study of field mice
called meadow voles around Love Canal in 1979. To make a long
story short, they could scarcely find any voles in the fields nearest the
canal-a habitat where there should have flourished-and those that
were trapped showed shorter lives, the toxin Lindane in their body
tissues and the type of liver problems that flag chemical exposure.22
These studies, using control groups and standard protocols, are hard
to fault.
The EPA Chromosome Study23 caused consternation both in
the community and among scientists. Eleven out of the thirty-six
samples examined showed abnormalities, but the investigators could
21 MAZUR, supra note 2, at 180.
22 John J. Christian, Love Canal's Unhealthy Voles, 8 NAT. HIST. 8, 8-16
(1983).
23 Dante Picciano, Pilot Cytogenic Study of Residents Living near Love
Canal: A Hazardous WasteSite, MAMMALIAN CHROMOSOMENEWSLETTERNo. 21,
at 86-93 (1980).
2001] 185
186 BUFFALO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 8
not convert these findings into clinical advice. At that, the community
finally lost its temper and seized two EPA field men as "hostages,"
probably precipitating final solutions. A second study, by the CDC,
finds no significant exposed/control differences in chromosomes, but
reexaminations of the first study's data generally support their
accuracy.
By June 1980, Governor Hugh Carey was frustrated with
conflicting scientific opinions and appointed a panel of experts to
resolve disagreements. The panel, chaired by Lewis Thomas of Sloan
Kettering Cancer Institute, drew these conclusions:
1. There were no acute health problems linked
directly to exposure.
2. Chronic health problems are neither proven
nor disproven-particularly cancers and
reproductive disorders.
3. They found the EPA chromosome study to be
"paradigm of administrative ineptitude."
4. Barron's nerve conduction study did more
harm than good because of the small sample.
5. The Paigen studies were anecdotal, lacked
controls and failed to get medical verification.
6. The NYS DOH managed to produce only
suggestions instead of findings, sharing many
of the supposed faults of Paigen's work.
From this, Hooker Chemical published a pamphlet pro-
claiming that there were no health problems at Love Canal. Mazur's
evaluation of this report is that it:
1. was arrogant to a fault;
2. failed to include key data and did not really
cite evidence; and
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3. mostly managed to increase antagonisms and
damage reputations.24
In short, the Thomas panel made many of the same types of
mistakes it had accused the investigators of, and in fact did not do
what the Governor had asked it to do-resolve disputes. My own
view is that this panel was not qualified to evaluate field studies,
distinguished though they may have been in other areas. I reviewed
literature on twenty-six toxic waste sites published between 1980 and
1990. Of the eighty-eight authors on all of these reports, not a single
one was found on the Thomas panel. It is not clear that any of them
had done community studies. They seemed too quick to condemn,
given the complexity ofthe situation, and I suspect that if any of these
panelists had had family members living at Love Canal, they would
have urged them to move, shaky though the evidence may have been.
It is clear to any objective observer that attacks like these and other
state actions ultimately led Beverly Paigen and her husband (also a
distinguished scientist) to leave this area-surely the kind of losses
that are not helpful to us. The state had killed the messenger.
The final round of studies began in 1980 as the NYS DOH
conducted further research on the outer ring group. By 1981, they
concluded that health problems here were pretty much what they were
anywhere. However, they confirmed elevated low birth weight figures
and more miscarriages in wet areas. When they finally did a cohort
analysis, it appeared that most of the low birth weight cases occurred
early in the community's history while toxins were still being dumped
into the ditch.25 Careful consideration of the history of toxic waste
sites is now emerging as a critical research strategy.
Beverly Paigen also begins a second round of studies on
children of outer ring homeowners as well as renters, both compared
to nearby control groups. Since children are more vulnerable to toxins
than adults, this represented a critical and insightful change in tactics.
24 MAZUR, supra note 2, at 184-86.
2 Nicholas J. Vianna & Adele K. Polan, Incidence ofLow Birth Weight
Among Love Canal Residence, 226 SCI. 1217, 1218-19 (1984).
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Her results had some agreements with those of the NYS DOH, but we
also found stature retardation (something not influenced by reporting
bias, and the anthropometrists did not know who was from what
area). Generally, wet/dry health distinctions persisted despite efforts
to discredit them.26
What many of the critics fail to recognize is that when a crisis
like that at Love Canal emerges, residents tend to become polarized.
Some are convinced their health problems have been induced by
toxins, and may over-report symptoms. However, based on our recent
research in Niagara County, there may be as many who deny health
threats from the environment and may under-report. This tends to
increase the variance in reported conditions, but does not clearly
intrude a directional bias. This is a substantial problem that needs
serious investigation.
V. Scientific Conclusions
1. Fetal damage has been observed among those
most likely to have been exposed."
2. Growth retardation is hard to refute. While it
may not be a problem in itself, it is a sign of
toxin exposure, and is as current as the child-
ren's ages.
3. Those in wet areas showed more health and
other problems than those in dry or control
areas, though the differences were not great.
4. We ignore the vole evidence at our peril.
Living on the very earth of Love Canal itself,
these little field creatures had shortened lives,
26 Beverly Paigen et al., Prevalence ofHealth Problems in Children Living
Near Love Canal, 2 HAZARDOUS WASTE& HAZARDOUS MATERIALS 23,23 (1985);
Beverly Paigen et al., Growth ofChildren Living Near the Hazardous Waste Site,
Love Canal, 59 HUM. BIOLOGY 489, 500 (1987).
27 However, this may have been more of a problem early in the history of
the community rather than later.
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and the types of liver problems due to one of
the compounds found there-dioxin. The
children played in that same earth near the 99'
Street School.
VI. What Love Canal Has Taught Us
A. Lessons for the scientific community are as
follows:
1. Be prepared. If you get a call for help tomor-
row, what exactly will you do?
2. Go to the community. Talk to people, and
make yourself listen.
3. Be constructive in your criticisms of colleagues'
work. Be sure you do not confuse laboratory or
clinical settings with field data gathering. Recog-
nize that you may be defensive.
4. Science is the art of the possible. If you have
only 500 households in your sample, deal with
it. If your tools do not match the task, make
new tools.
5. Use parsimony. Trust the voles. Multidiscipli-
nary work is more likely to resolve ambiguity
than specialized effort.
B. Universities also have something to learn:
1. Top down research is less likely to work than
that originating in the researcher's head.
2. A little seed money goes a long way, but don't
require a 20 page grant application to get it.
3. Advanced, multidisciplinary training in environ-
mental assessment is no longer an option.
4. Political constraint on research is an excep-
tionally bad practice.
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C. Finally, here are some thoughts for the policy field:
1. Science had an effect at Love Canal through
committee testimony, public meetings and the
press. Journal publication is too slow in a crisis.
2. Turf defense issues pushed government
agencies responsible for public welfare into
conflict. Someone needs authority to coordi-
nate government agency efforts.
3. Secrecy is a bad idea.
4. Self interest distorts everything.
VII. Conclusion
We learned a lot trying to manage the crisis at Love Canal.
We just need to heed the lessons. Most of the studies did not disagree
as much as many of the players tried to assert if we accommodate for
some methodological differences. There truly is more than one way
to understand things, and we need to adhere to all, not to one.
191HISTORY OF LOVE CANAL
Appendix A








LaSalle Housing built (west of the dump)
School Board buys the dump site
99' Street School built
Neighborhood development




EPA finds Ring I toxins
Health Commissioner visits the site
Citizen action group forms
NYS DOH preliminary study
August 2, health emergency declared for
Ring I households
NYS DOH health survey, Outer Ring
Gibbs/Paigen study starts
Swale theory conceived by Gibbs
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7. 1979: Partial evacuation, Outer Ring
ABC's "The Killing Ground" airs on
national television
NYS DOH resists full evacuation
8. 1980: EPA chromosome study
Paigen begins canal/control study
October, President Carter signs
Senator Javits'home buyout bill
Love Canal Revitalization Agency formed
9. 1981/2: EPA re-tests, finds Inner Ring, storm sewer
toxins
US Health Dept says Outer Ring toxins are not
at significantly higher levels than in
surrounding areas, but study is criticized
10. 1988: NYS DOH re-tests, finds North & West areas
"suitable for residential use"
11. 1990: "Black Creek Village" (North of Colvin)
approved for reoccupation
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Table 2. University at Buffalo faculty members
who served on the U.B. Task Force on Love Canal
(The Naughton Panel), 1980.
John Naughton (Medicine), Organizer
Robin Bannerman (Medicine, Genetics)
Edward Carr (Pharmacology)
Max Chilcote (Erie County Laboratories)







A. Theodore Steegmann, Jr. (Anthropology)
Harry Sultz (Social & Preventive Medicine)
John Vena (Social & Preventive Medicine)
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Appendix C
Figure 1. This map shows the geography around Love Canal during
the environmental crisis of 1978 to 1980.28
28 GIBBS, supra note 2, at 18.
